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CASENOTES 
INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY BENEFITS TO 
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION 
127 
The United States brought action against an insurance corpo-
ration to recover benefits under a contract of insurance assigned 
by the insured to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. Under 
the contract the defendant agreed to pay the insured according 
to a schedule of benefits for "expenses actually incurred" be-
cause of poliomyelitis. During the policy term the insured was 
stricken with this disease, and being a veteran, he applied for 
admission to a Veterans' Administration hospital. He was granted 
admission upon his execution of an assignment to the Adminis-
trator of Veterans' Affairs of all claims for medical expenses 
which he might have raised against defendant by virtue of the 
insurance contract. Defendant denied any liability under the 
assignment. Held: the insured had not actually incurred any 
expenses and therefore had no rights under the contract which 
could be assigned.1 
The instant case is one of first impression and is of wide-
spread importance to the insurance field. Although many prob-
lems may arise from such a holding, the intent of the act in 
question substantiates the holding, and any corrective measures 
to be taken should be effected on a legislative level. 
In interpreting the contract,2 the court concluded that the 
words "expenses actually incurred" meant that the insured had 
to incur a real legal obligation to pay expenses.3 To decide 
l United States v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 133 F. Supp. 726 
(D. Neb. 1955). 
2 The insurance contract included these provisions: 
PART I FOR POLIOMYELITIS Upon receipt of due proof that the 
Insured . • . shall have become afflicted with definitely diagnosed 
J;>oliomyelitis . . . the Company will pay the Insured the benefits set 
forth in Part II of this policy in the amount of the expenses actually 
incurred by the Insured for the required treatment received there-
fore by the Insured. . . . 
PART II SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS The benefits payable under this 
Policy shall be in accordance with the provisions and limitations of 
Part I hereof for expenses actually incurred by the Insured for: 
. . . hospital care, medical care. . . . 
3 Expenses are not "incurred" during a taxable year, under an Internal 
Revenue Act, unless the legal obligation to pay them has arisen. Stern-
Slegman-Prins Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1935); Bauer 
Brothers Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1931); Desco Corp. 
v. United States, 55 F.2d 411 (D. Del. 1932). See also for other rela-
tions Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, 9 N.W.2d 777 (1943); State v. 
Moore, 192 Ore. 39, 233 P.2d 253 (1951). 
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whether the insured had such a legal obligation, it is necessary to 
examine the statute4 and to determine the validity of the adminis-
trative regulation requiring the assignment. 5 
The statute has two parts, enacted at different times. 6 The 
language and legislative history7 indicate that it was the intent of 
Congress to make that part of the statute following the word 
"provided" mandatory, so as to give hospital treatment to any 
veteran: (1) not dishonorably discharged, (2) in need of hos-
4 48 Stat. 9 (1933), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952). "In addition 
to the pensions provided in this chapter the .Administrator of Veterans' 
.Affairs is authorized under such limitations as he may prescribe, and 
within the limits of existing Veterans' .Administration facilities, to furnish 
to men discharged from the .Army, . . . for disabilities incurred in the 
line of duty or to those in receipt of pension for service-connected dis-
ability, and to veterans of any war, ... domiciliary care where they are 
suffering with permanent disabilities, ... and medical and hospital treat-
ment for diseases or injuries: Provided, That any veteran of any war 
who was not dishonorably discharged, suffering from disability, disease or 
defect, who is in need of hospitalization or domiciliary care and is unable 
to defray the necessary expenses therefor . . . shall be furnished necessary 
hospitalization ... in any Veterans' .Administration facility, within the 
limitations existing in such facilities, irrespective of whether the disability, 
disease, or defect was due to service .... " 
ti 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(d) (Supp. Jan. 1, 1955). "(d) Persons hospital-
ized ... who it is believed may be entitled to hospital care or medical or 
surgical treatment or to reimbursement for all or part of the cost there-
of, by reason of statutory, contractual, or other relationships with third 
parties, including those liable for damages by reason of negligence or 
other legal wrong, will not be furnished hospital treatment without charge 
therefor to the extent of the amount for which third parties are or will 
become liable, and such patients will be requested to execute appropriate 
assignment or other instrument which will entitle the .Administrator . . . 
to receive and to collect, directly or as assignee, from the third party or 
parties, to the extent of the amounts for which such third party is liable, 
the cost of such care and treatment as determined under the applicable 
rules and regulations, including medical fee schedules, of the Veterans 
.Administration. The words 'by reason of statutory or contractual relation-
ship' as used in this paragraph include, but are not limited to (1) member-
ship in a union, fraternal or other organization, ( 2) rights under a group 
hospitalization plan, or under any insurance contract or plan which pro-
vides for payment or reimbursement for the cost of medical or hospital 
care, and conditions the obligation of the insurer to pay upon payment 
or incurrence of liability by the person covered, ( 3) 'workmen's compensa-
tion' or 'employers' liability' statutes, State or Federal, ( 4) right to 'main-
tenance and cure' in admirality." 
6 The part of the statute, quoted supra note 4, which precedes the word 
"Provided" was enacted as section 6 of the .Act of March 20, 1933, 48 
Stat. 9 (1933), with amendment by the .Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 
301 (1933). The part following the word "Provided" was added by 
amendment in the .Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 525 (1934). 
178 Cong. Rec. 3288 (1934). 
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pitalization, and (3) unable to defray necessary expenses.8 This 
part of the statute makes imperative the allowance of hospitaliza-
tion, and the Veterans' Administration is without authority to 
devitalize that right of a veteran, or to condition its enjoyment 
by regulation. The court found that the language authorizing the 
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to furnish discharged vet-
erans hospital treatment, "under such limitations as he may pre-
scribe,"9 applies only to that part of the statute preceding the 
word "provided" and does not limit the mandatory character of 
the remaining portion of the statute. 
The plaintiff pressed upon the court two other sections of the 
act regarding the authority of the Administrator10 and argued 
that regulations promulgated by the Administrator within the 
authority of the statute have the effect of law.11 But the court 
found that these two sections deal with administrative decisions 
upon claims for benefits within the bestowal of the Veterans' 
Administration, not with the exercise of such administrative au-
thority as is involved in the promulgation of regulations or in 
the making of interpretative rulings. The regulation12 was held 
not to be within the authority of the administrator. 
Since the insured received essentially charitable benefits in 
the veterans' hospital and did not actually incur e}>.-penses, the 
assignment represented an unmatured claim under the policy; 
and the plaintiff acquired no greater rights than the insured. 
s Note that 48 Stat. 525 (1934), 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952) also provides: 
"The statement under oath of the applicant on such form as may be 
prescribed by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall be accepted as 
sufficient evidence of inability to defray necessary expenses." 
9 48 Stat. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952). 
10 48 Stat. 9 (1933), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 705 (1952). "All deci-
sions rendered by the Administrator . . . under the provisions of sec-
tions ... 706, ... of this title or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, 
shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no ... 
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review ... any such 
decision." 
54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. § lla-2 (1952). "Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of law, except as provided in sections 445 and 817 
of this title, the decisions of the Administrator . . . on any question of 
law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any Act 
administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and con-
clusive and no ... court of the United States shall have power or juris-
diction to review any such decision." 
11 Helliwell v. Haberman, 140 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1944); Bernick v_ 
Coddon, 65 F. Supp. 89 (D. Minn. 1946); Stanger v. Glenn L. Martin. 
Co., 56 F. Supp. 163 (D. Md. 1944). 
12 See note 5 supra. 
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The administrative regulation, which the court refused to 
enforce, required assignment of hospital and medical benefits to 
which the veteran might become entitled "by reason of statu-
tory, contractual, or other relationships with third parties, in-
cluding those liable for damages by reason of negligence or other 
legal wrong." This decision may affect not only the insurance 
industry,13 but also veterans who are receiving hospital benefits 
under this federal statute. Since the furnishing of hospital care 
to qualified veterans14 is mandatory, the effect of the decision is 
that in many cases the veteran will be able to receive hospital and 
medical care under the statute and also be reimbursed by a third 
party.16 In view of the positive language of the act, the problem 
of whether the taxpayer should give the veteran a double recovery 
in this situation is not for the courts, but for Congress. 
Hal W. Bauer, '56 
13 Other insurance contracts also agree to pay the insured for hospital 
and medical "expenses actually incurred." These are so-called "indemnity" 
contracts. See the Medical Payments provision of the National Standard 
Automobile policy which agrees "to pay all reasonable expenses incurr-
ed .... " 
14 The requirement that the veteran be "unable to defray the necessary 
expenses" of hospital care seems to have no enforceable standard. See 
note 8 supra. 
tG ( 1) A veteran receiving hospital and medical care under the federal 
statute may also receive benefits under Nebraska's workmen's compensa-
tion law. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120 (Reissue 1948): "The employer shall be 
liable for reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines as and 
when needed ..•. " Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-130 (Reissue 1948) provides: 
No savings or insurance of the injured employee . . . independent 
of this act shall be taken into consideration in determining the 
compensation to be paid thereunder; nor shall benefits derived 
from any other source . . . be considered in fixing compensation 
under this act. 
(2) Many insurance contracts do not contain the condition precedent 
of "actually incurring expenses," and the veteran would have a right to 
collect under this type of contract whether or not he incurred a legal 
obligation to pay hospital and medical expenses. These are so-called 
"valued policy" contracts. The personal accident policy which pays a 
specified amount for a certain type of injury is an example. 
(3) The veteran may have a cause of action in a negligence suit 
against a third party. 
